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Many are concerned that America has not been doing well in either equality of outcomes or opportunity. Our nation has obtained the dubious distinction of being the country among advanced countries with the highest level of inequality of outcomes and 
one of the lowest levels of equality of opportunity. 
This paper discusses the issue of inequality and inequality of opportunity, 
how Federal Reserve policies affect inequality, and what implications  
inequality should have for the conduct of Fed policy. I shall address both  
its role in macroeconomic management and in the regulation of financial 
markets. After a brief review of the state of inequality in the United States 
today, I will discuss the various channels through which the Federal Reserve 
affects inequality. 
The State of Inequality in America
As I wrote in my book The Price of Inequality (2012), the American dream 
is, today, to a large extent simply a myth. The life prospects of a young 
American are more dependent on the income and education of his parents 
than in almost any of the other advanced countries. 
When concerns about America’s growing inequality surfaced a few years 
ago, some seemed to suggest that we should not be too concerned. What 
really mattered, it was argued, what really had made America a great country, 
was its equality of opportunity. But then, upon closer examination, it turned 
out that we were failing there, too. 
For scholars of the distribution of income and wealth, this did not come 
as a surprise, for inequality of income and inequality of opportunity are 
closely linked. We can see this if we look across countries, or even if we look 
across counties in the United States. 
As Americans, we should be concerned about inequality of opportunity 
because it runs so counter to broadly shared values. 
Inequality and Economic Performance 
But as economists, we should be concerned because inequality and 
inequality of opportunity is associated with poorer economic performance 
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and higher levels of instability. This was, in fact, one of the central themes of 
my book—highlighted by the title—The Price of Inequality. 
The adverse effect of inequality on economic performance is the reason, 
too, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has put the issue of inequal-
ity at the center of its economic agenda. The IMF is concerned with helping 
countries achieve better economic performance, including greater economic 
stability. It now recognizes that greater equality and equality of opportunity is 
linked with improved performance and greater stability. The channels through 
which these effects are realized are an important research topic. 
The notion that equality and economic performance can be complementary 
represents a recent and major evolution in economic thought. Arthur Okun, 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Johnson, 
wrote a famous book called The Big Trade-Off (1975), the theme of which was 
that we could only have more equality if we were willing to give up on eco-
nomic growth. The new perspective argues to the contrary—that equality and 
economic performance can be complementary. 
The Meaning and Measurement of Economic Performance: 
Going beyond GDP
As an aside, I have deliberately been vague about what we should mean by 
economic performance. The International Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress, which I chaired, unanimously con-
cluded that GDP was not a good measure of performance (see the commission 
report by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010).
There are many ways in which GDP is deficient. It fails, for instance, to 
reflect changes in security, an important dimension of well-being. The Federal 
Reserve is often judged on the basis of how well it has done in terms of the 
growth and stability of GDP. But the societal cost of the failure to maintain 
stability—of avoiding crises like that of 2008—is not well captured in standard 
GDP metrics. 
The impact of the Fed’s failure to ensure economic stability on insecurity 
should be obvious; but this crisis was particularly costly because so many also 
faced the risk of losing their most important asset. I will argue in this paper 
that the Fed has both “negative” and “positive” responsibilities: not only the 
responsibility of preventing harm, for instance as a result of instability, but a 
positive responsibility in ensuring that financial markets work like they should. 
It failed in ensuring that America had a mortgage market that would enable 
individuals to retain ownership of their homes in the face of a severe economic 
downturn, and the costs of this failure are obvious. 
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There is another cost, which research at the Fed has highlighted: a prolonged 
downturn, such as that which followed the 2008 crisis, has long-term effects 
on potential future growth. The value of the reduction in the expected present 
discounted of future GDP is enormous. In our metrics of the cost of the crisis, 
we should include this. These costs dwarf any estimate of the costs of any con-
ceivable increase in inflation. It should be clear that monetary policy should have 
been more focused on avoiding these huge costs (see Stiglitz 2015). 
One of the very important ways in which the standard measure is deficient is 
that GDP per capita describes only the average GDP per capita. It says nothing 
about what is happening to the typical individual (e.g., median income). GDP 
per capita could be increasing, yet most individuals could be experiencing a 
decline in their living standards. Certainly, if an economic system fails to deliver 
meaningful well-being for significant fractions of its population, it is questionable 
whether that system should be viewed as a successful economic system. 
At its most basic, I claim that central bank policy has significant distributional 
effects, and in this paper, I will describe the various channels through which the 
policies of the Fed (or other central banks) affect equality and opportunity. 
I should emphasize that these are under-researched topics. Upon close 
investigation, I am sure some of these will turn out to be more important than 
others. I am also sure, though, that the overall conclusion—that central bank 
policy has significant distributional effects—will stand. These distributional 
effects are not only important in their own right—with significant social conse-
quences—but they can even affect the impacts of monetary policy on GDP as 
conventionally measured. 
The Distributional Consequences of the Failure 
to Maintain Full Employment
There are two broad categories of channels through which monetary policy 
affects distribution. The first, the most obvious, and the most closely linked 
with one of the central missions of the Fed is its role in maintaining full 
employment and economic stability. These are effects that are mediated mainly 
through the role of the Fed in controlling interest rates and credit availability. 
The Fed also plays a critical role in regulating our financial system, and how it 
performs this function also has important effects on distribution. These effects 
are discussed in subsequent sections of this paper.
High unemployment hurts ordinary workers in three ways. It does so 
directly, not just for those who lose their jobs but also through the stress 
imposed on other workers as they worry about keeping their jobs. It also hurts 
ordinary workers through the downward pressure on wages that inevitably 
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results, and through the cutbacks in public expenditures, especially at the 
local and state level, that follow from weak economic performance. Each of 
these effects—increased unemployment, falling wages, cutbacks in public 
services—are felt especially hard at the bottom of the income distribution.1 
Managing the Inflation/Unemployment Trade-Off
Today, there is a wide acceptance of a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, at least in the short run, and perhaps in the long run. But 
how that trade-off is managed can have important implications for inequal-
ity. There are two critical issues. 
Uncertainty
One concerns uncertainty: we don’t know for sure, for instance, the value 
of the Non-Accelerating Income Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), the level 
of unemployment below which inflation starts to increase. There are risks 
of targeting too low a level of unemployment—an increase in inflation, and 
risks associated with targeting too high a level—an unnecessarily high level 
of unemployment. But those different risks are borne differently by different 
parts of our society. (The overall risk is more complicated, as I pointed out in 
my Marshall lectures a number of years ago: the overall societal costs depend 
on the costs of correcting a mistake made at a later date, and the relationship 
between expected costs and benefits of a marginally more aggressive policy 
depends on the concavity or convexity of the augmented-Phillips curve.) 
What I want to emphasize here is that an excessive focus on inflation sta-
bility rather than output stability itself could lead not only to a larger average 
output gap but also to an increase in inequality. On both accounts, societal 
welfare is lowered. 
Asymmetries in the Effects of Monetary Policy
The way that monetary policy has been conducted has asymmetric effects: 
what workers lose in the downturn they do not seem to make up in the 
recovery. This is related in part to asymmetric effects of monetary pol-
icy—which is more effective in reducing output than in expanding produc-
tion—but it is also related to the aggressiveness with which the objective of 
avoiding inflation is pursued. 
Typically, when the economy goes into a recession, real wages fall. As the 
economy recovers, wages start to rise. To recover lost ground, and to keep 
1 There is an expanding literature on these subjects. For an earlier analysis showing that the brunt of 
unemployment is felt at the bottom, see Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
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up with productivity, wages should rise significantly. But if, as this happens, 
the central bank, worried about the incipient inflation that this may bring 
about, tightens monetary policy, workers will never be able to make up in the 
recovery what they lost in the downturn. There is a downward ratchet effect. 
There is some evidence that such a process has been in play. 
For individuals too, there is an asymmetry—the loss of a job implies a loss 
of human capital, and therefore expected wages going forward will be lower: 
hysteresis is real.
Contributing to a Jobless Recovery:  
Impacts in the Short Run vs. the Long
There is one more effect of monetary policy, as conventionally defined—
an unintended effect, but one which cannot be ignored. Lower interest rates 
have two effects. They are intended to induce more investment. But they 
change the relative cost of capital and labor. Even though real wages have not 
done well in recent years, the decrease in the cost of capital (at least for those 
firms having easy access to funds) has been much greater. 
Standard micro-theory would suggest that this would lead firms to 
invest in more capital-intensive technologies. It may pay (and has paid) 
them to invest in machines that replace even low-skilled workers—e.g., the 
automated check-out machines at grocery and drug stores throughout the 
country. This can have long-lasting (hysteresis) effects, evident most clearly in 
vintage capital models. It implies, in particular, that if we were able to restore 
output at time T to a given level Q*T, the level of employment at that output 
will be lower than it otherwise would have been, had we not had this period 
of super-low interest rates. To put it another way, it means that the level of 
output that we have to attain at time T to achieve the same level of employ-
ment will have to be that much higher. In effect, the low interest rates help 
create a jobless recovery. And, the jobless recovery has all the adverse effects 
on inequality that I discussed earlier. 
Of course, when there is a deficiency in aggregate demand, as there has 
been since 2008, it is natural that the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates. 
This recession has been, as we all know, extreme. If the Fed focused more on 
increasing credit availability (rather than just lowering interest rates), these 
adverse effects might be mitigated.
In the current context, the observation of this adverse effect on income 
distribution is mostly a reminder of the limitations of monetary policy. It 
would have been far better—for this as well as other reasons—if we had 
stimulated the economy through fiscal policy. But that is a bigger question, 
for another paper.
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Impacts on the Elderly
There is still another effect of monetary policy, as conventionally defined: 
lower interest rates have a particularly adverse effect on those retired individ-
uals who have, out of prudential concerns, put much of their savings into 
short-term government bonds. The representative agent models often used by 
macroeconomists (or at least used before the 2008 crisis) by definition paid no 
attention to this and other distributive effects. Whether differences in marginal 
propensities to consume among different groups are sufficiently large that these 
distributive effects have macroeconomic significance may be debated; but that 
these policies have distinctly different effects on different groups cannot. 
Older theories discussed how low interest rates helped borrowers at the 
expense of creditors. But that view is too simplistic for understanding the 
distributive effects of monetary policy in a modern economy. Increasingly, 
workers are relying on defined contribution pension programs, which means 
that they are very dependent on the returns to their savings for their livelihood. 
Similar effects arise, perhaps with even greater strength, with quantita-
tive easing (QE). One of the main channels asserted for its effectiveness was 
through the wealth effect—the increase in stock prices, the benefit of which 
went overwhelmingly to the top 1 percent—one of the reasons perhaps for 
the relative weakness of the effect, and one of the reasons QE contributed to 
wealth inequality. Data on wealth ownership show clearly that the portfolios 
of the rich are weighed more toward equity. Lowering interest rates benefits 
owners of equity—that is those at the top. There is, in effect, a transfer from 
holders of T-bills to holders of equity, and that transfer is a transfer which 
increases inequality of income and wealth. 
Inequality and Explanations of the Limited 
Impact of Monetary Policy
From the beginning of the crisis, the Federal Reserve was forthright about 
its limited ability to restore the economy to full employment. Much of the 
policy was directed just at saving the financial sector; that was necessary if the 
economy was to be restored quickly to health, but it was not sufficient.
For the real economy to return to health required the resuscitation of aggre-
gate demand. But if there are differences in marginal propensities to consume 
(and I believe the evidence is overwhelming that there are), then inequality 
affects the monetary policy transmission mechanism, and Fed policy has to be 
sensitive to this. The previous paragraphs explained how lower interest rates 
could increase inequality, by hurting elderly dependent on returns on T-bills 
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even as they benefited those at the top who own shares. But if the interest 
elasticity of investment and of consumers who are not constrained is low, then 
the net effect of lowering interest rates can be negative. This is even more so if 
many middle-class individuals are target savers—for instance, saving for retire-
ment or to finance the college education of their children; then, lower interest 
rates imply a higher savings rate.
There are actions that the Fed could have taken, even within its limitations, 
to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy—actions that simultaneously 
would have reduced the adverse effects of monetary policy on inequality. 
The Importance of Fixing the Credit Channel
One of the criticisms of QE was that much of the increase in liquidity 
went abroad and into increases in asset prices, and disappointingly little went 
into an expansion of credit. One of the reasons is that the credit channel was 
blocked. When the crisis struck, much of the focus of attention was on the big 
banks, who had engaged in such speculation. They were saved, but hundreds 
of smaller and regional banks—institutions that were more involved in lending 
to real businesses and to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—were 
let go. (There was a rationale for this behavior: it was natural that the Fed and 
the Administration focus on systemically significant institutions; but from a 
macroeconomic perspective, cutbacks in lending to the large number of smaller 
financial institutions have systemic effects as well. The consequences of this 
unbalanced program were given short shrift.)
This is one (though only one) of the reasons that lending to SMEs remained 
so far below its pre-crisis level years after the crisis. And the lack of flow of 
lending to SMEs is one of the reasons that our recovery remained so anemic 
for so long.
In short, the Fed (like the Administration) seemed to practice (and perhaps 
believe in) trickle-down economics. To me, it is not a surprise that it didn’t 
work, and that the recovery was so weak. 
The Importance of Making Markets More Competitive
Another channel through which it was hoped that QE would stimulate 
the economy was lowering the cost of mortgages, and increasing the prices 
of homes. While it almost surely had some effects along these lines, again the 
effects were sometimes disappointing, and again because we failed to address 
underlying problems in the financial system. The mortgage market is now 
less competitive than it was before the crisis, and the lower interest rates were 
typically not fully passed through to borrowers. Sometimes, it seemed a major 
Fed Policy, Inequality, and Equality of Opportunity 85
effect of the Fed’s actions in lowering interest rates was to enrich the coffers  
of the banks. 
The failure to ensure adequate competition of financial markets leads to 
higher inequality in several ways: there are transfers from ordinary citizens to 
well-off banks (as a result of higher interest rate spreads and higher fees charged 
for services, including those associated with the running of the payments sys-
tem through debit and credit cards). And if the effects of monetary policy are 
less effectively transmitted to consumers, the economy is less likely to remain 
close to full employment.
Preventing the Financial Sector from Harming 
the Rest of the Economy
Traditional discussions of the Federal Reserve have focused on the role of 
the Fed in regulating the macroeconomy through its control of interest rates. 
But in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, attention has shifted to its regulatory 
roles. It was its failure to adequately regulate the financial system more than its 
failure to set interest rates correctly that led to the crisis—as both the Fed itself 
and most academic critics have argued (see, for instance, Stiglitz 2010 and the 
references cited there). 
In recent years, the focus of regulatory reforms has been on preventing 
the financial sector from imposing harms on the rest of the economy. This is 
important, and it is especially important to mention this in any discussion of 
the role of the Fed in inequality. The worst harm that the financial sector has 
imposed is bringing on crises—many of our major downturns, including that 
of 2008, arise from financial crises, typically generated by excessive credit and 
excessive risk taking. 
Crises are particularly hard on the poor, and this crisis especially so, as mil-
lions of Americans lost their homes, their jobs, and their retirement accounts. 
The Fed, through its failure to fulfill its responsibility to maintain stability, 
bears some onus for the enormous increase in inequality that has occurred 
since 2008. The excessive focus on inflation—which, as I have suggested, con-
tributed to the growing inequality before the crisis—had an even more adverse 
effect: it detracted from a focus on stability. 
This was ironic, because the Fed itself was founded in response to the Panic 
of 1907—not because of a bout of inflation. The losses from the crisis—the 
deviation from where the economy would have been had the economy con-
tinued on its normal path and the output actually experienced—have already 
mounted to trillions of dollars, far larger than any cost that could have been 
attributed to mild inflation. 
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Preventing the Financial Sector from Exploiting Others
Preventing the financial sector from doing harm to our society entails, of 
course, doing more than ensuring that it does not act in a reckless way. We also 
have to ensure that it does not act in ways which exploit others—and especially 
exploit those who are poor. America’s financial sector has excelled at this—
moving money from the bottom of the pyramid to the top, and thus increasing 
inequality and reducing equality of opportunity. 
We now all know about the predatory and discriminatory lending that was 
rampant in the run-up to the crisis. But such lending practices, though dimin-
ished, still continue, contributing to the impoverishment of large numbers of 
our citizens through payday loans, subprime auto loans, usurious credit card 
fees, predatory education loans, and rent-a-center and similar abusive attempts 
to circumvent the little regulations that we have on usury. 
These are problems that have been long with us. When I was in the  
Clinton administration, we tried to curtail the predatory for-profit education 
sector, which prospered solely because of government loans and other forms of 
government support, including government guarantees for student loans from 
an equally predatory private financial sector. We failed because of the political 
power of the sector. 
But it is not just the poor that the financial sector has exploited in ways that 
increase inequality. It has also exploited average Americans through noncom-
petitive practices that have led to high fees imposed on merchants for the use 
of credit and debit cards. These fees represent, in effect, a tax that is imposed 
on every transaction—ironically, a transactions tax that is far, far higher than 
the minimal financial transactions taxes that some countries have proposed and 
to which the financial sector has objected so strenuously. And it is a tax that 
does not go to public purposes, but simply to enrich the coffers of the financial 
institutions. Inevitably, the costs of these fees get shifted to ordinary consum-
ers, and since the benefits of the high-reward, high-fee cards go to the rich, the 
effect of these noncompetitive practices has been to redistribute income from 
poor and middle-income Americans to the rich. 
Other countries’ central banks—most significantly Australia—have taken 
strong actions to curb these abusive practices, and they seem to have worked. 
Finally, recent court decisions in the United States provide some hope that they 
will be curbed here, too. But I cannot but remark that I think the implemen-
tation by the Fed of the Durbin Amendment, the congressional provision 
attempting to curb these abuses—limited as it was to debit cards—was woe-
fully inadequate, as Judge Richard Leon concluded, even if the Appellate Court 
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decided that such a decision was within the discretion of the Fed.2 
It would have been far better for our economy—and for inequality—if 
Congress had acted earlier; if when it acted, it had included credit cards as well 
as debit cards; and if the Fed, when it came to implementing these regulations, 
had acted more vigorously to ensure competitive pricing. 
The Fed’s Positive Agenda: Making Financial 
Markets Serve All Americans
The Federal Reserve, as I have said, has important regulatory responsibili-
ties, besides its macroeconomic management responsibilities, and among those 
is to ensure that the financial system does not harm the rest of the economy. I 
have just detailed many of the ways in which the financial sector’s actions have 
increased inequality. 
But the responsibility of the Fed is broader. There is a positive agenda: to 
ensure that the financial markets serve all Americans. 
Too much of the recent discussions about regulatory reform have focused 
on preventing the financial sector from imposing harm on the rest of the econ-
omy, especially by the excesses of risk taking which brought on the 2008 crisis; 
too little has been about how to ensure that the financial sector actually does 
what it should. 
Earlier in this paper I have described two examples: making financial 
markets more competitive and fixing the credit channel. The broader positive 
agenda entails making the financial system actually act like how a competitive, 
transparent, financial system should, serving the interests of the country rather 
than just its own interests and recognizing that the financial system is not 
an end in itself, but a means to an end—to a more prosperous economy. In 
particular, this means ensuring that the credit channel works; that, for instance, 
funds are provided to small and medium-sized enterprises. Access to funds 
for new entrepreneurs, for ambitious young people striving to get ahead, is an 
important way in which opportunity is enhanced. Interestingly, when I was 
in China in the spring of 2015, discussing with the Premier the high level of 
inequality that afflicted that country, he put particular stress on this aspect of 
China’s agenda. 
If the banking system is to do this, its attention needs to be redirected, from 
the kind of activities that were more recently the focus of its attention—such as 
2 As a matter of disclosure, I have served as an expert witness in the litigation against the credit card 
companies. The most recent court decisions have concurred with my judgment that the practices of the 
credit and debit card companies have been highly anticompetitive. 
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trading, speculation, market manipulation, etc. That’s why regulations like the 
Volcker rule, the Lincoln Amendment (which was unfortunately repealed), and 
similar provisions are so important. 
Ensuring Access to Credit
But the Fed and other regulatory agencies overseeing the financial sec-
tor have a larger responsibility. They need to affirmatively work to create a 
competitive and transparent financial sector focused on providing broader 
access to finance. This was, of course, one of the intentions of the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA), which I believe has, overall, worked. 
CRA illustrates how a government mandate to lend to underserved commu-
nities can actually focus attention on a critical issue in an effective way. Once 
its attention was focused on lending to underserved communities, our financial 
sector figured out how to do it in ways that were profitable. It used its ingenu-
ity to identify good potential borrowers, and to work with them to make sure 
that the businesses were a success. 
Supporting Community and Regional Banks
But there is much, much more that needs to be done and can be done. I 
mentioned earlier that in the crisis we paid too little attention to our commu-
nity and regional banks and other financial institutions. These local banks play 
an important role in the development of the communities of which they are 
a part. In the years since the repeal of Glass-Steagall, our banking system has 
evolved into one that is not only more reckless, but more concentrated, with 
less competition, less concern for providing finance to the small businesses 
of our country, and in which our community and regional banks play a less 
important role. But acknowledging the potential role of these banks is not an 
argument for allowing them to engage in the bad practices of the larger banks. 
Helping Create a Housing Mortgage Market That Works— 
for All Americans 
Consider the housing finance market. Our private system clearly failed, at 
great cost to millions of homeowners and our economy. I was among many 
who pointed out, at the very beginning of the securitization movement, the 
inherent flaws, related to problems of imperfect information (see Stiglitz 1992). 
It is noteworthy that nine years after the breaking of the housing bubble, 
eight years after the beginning of the recession, we have not been able to 
restore the private mortgage market. Part of the reason, I believe, relates to the 
inherent flaws in the securitization model that I have discussed elsewhere. But 
we also have to admit that for all the so-called innovativeness of the financial 
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sector, it failed to innovate in ways that would enable ordinary American 
homeowners to manage the risk of homeownership. 
The financial sector’s innovation was more directed toward its ability to, 
as the title of George Akerlof and Rob Shiller’s 2015 book puts it, “phish for 
phools”—to better identify those that it could exploit. There are alternative 
mortgage products that would be far more efficient in lowering transactions 
costs and managing risks, but evidently, our financial markets were not inter-
ested. In a forthcoming Roosevelt Institute paper, I set out a set of reforms that I 
believe would lead to a better performing mortgage market. 
I emphasize this here because nothing has done more to increase inequality 
of wealth and decrease homeownership rates, which have markedly decreased 
(after peaking at some 69 percent in the mid-2000s, it is now at a 20-year low, 
under 64 percent). The impacts have been particularly severe upon Hispanics 
and African Americans.
Financing Higher Education
Building up our communities entails not just providing better access to 
credit for our businesses and families, but also enhancing opportunities for 
individuals to get ahead. We need a better way of financing higher education. 
We need to do better than just the modest proposal to provide better access to 
community colleges that the President has put forward. 
We have to provide access to the best education for which each person is 
qualified. We can’t have a system that says that if you are poor, you can go to an 
underfunded community college; but if your parents are rich, you can go to a 
higher-tier school. And we especially shouldn’t have a system that allows private 
for-profit schools to engage in their predatory activities, taking advantage of 
poor Americans—with private lenders and the government complicit in provid-
ing loans that will be a noose around their necks. Australia has shown that there 
is an alternative: an income-contingent loan program can provide opportunity 
for all, enhancing societal mobility. 
Inequality and Central Bank Independence
No matter what the Federal Reserve does, it has an effect on inequality, for 
good or for bad. Given the importance of inequality in our society, it needs to 
pay attention to these effects. It would need to pay attention to these effects 
even if it saw its only mission as macroeconomic performance and stability. 
We are long past the day when economists could appeal to the Second Welfare 
Theorem, to use economic jargon, which says that the role of the economists is 
to maximize GDP and that issues of distribution should be left to others. Today, 
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we understand why both the First and Second Welfare theorems (asserting that 
markets are always efficient and that every Pareto-efficient outcome is attainable 
through market mechanisms, with appropriate lump sum redistributions) are of 
limited relevance. 
If monetary policy has these large distributive effects, a question naturally 
arises: how can we justify delegating fundamental social trade-offs to techno-
crats? Can we really justify the kind of independence that central banks seem to 
prize? And especially when central banks are engaged in quasi-fiscal transfers, 
giving money to some financial institutions and withholding it from others, 
and even more so when many “independent” central banks seem to have been 
captured by the financial sector, a kind of capture that might have been more 
difficult if there was more accountability or more representativeness in their 
boards. 
Was it an accident that many of the so-called “independent” central banks 
performed far more poorly in the run-up to the Great Recession than those that 
were more politically accountable? Did their independence make them more 
easily captured by the financial sector, which saw increased profits in the agenda 
of deregulation and loose regulation? There are subtle questions in institutional 
design that I cannot adequately address here; few would want to turn over the 
conduct of monetary policy to some of the politicians that dot the political 
landscape. Suffice it to say that once one recognizes the distributive conse-
quences of central bank policy, a more nuanced approach is required.
Overview: Monetary Policy and Inequality
The Federal Reserve was created in recognition of the fact that market econ-
omies are not self-regulating. It was created to deal with a problem of financial 
instability, but over time, its mandate expanded, to include full employment, 
growth, and inflation. In the years preceding the crisis of 2008, it lost its way: 
it seemed to focus single-mindedly on inflation, in the mistaken belief that 
doing so would ensure growth and stability. As we have observed, it even forgot 
its own history: it was not created in response to a bout of inflation, but in 
response to the Panic of 1907. 
Today, fortunately, it seems to be regaining its footing. Many if not most 
members of the Fed recognize its responsibility for the broader management of 
the economy. Whether it likes it or not, what the Fed does has significant effects 
on inequality. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Fed policy, in turn, depends on 
many features of the economy over which it has some control, both through its 
macroeconomic and regulatory instruments: it depends, for instance, on both 
the level of inequality and on the competitiveness of the financial system. 
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We have thus come to understand that monetary authorities should recog-
nize that they have more tools and instruments and broader objectives—both 
intermediary goals and ultimate objectives—than has been traditionally con-
ceived. GDP is itself an intermediary goal—the ultimate objective is increas-
ing the well-being of our society. Within this broader perspective, there should 
be a concern about inequality both because of how it affects overall economic 
performance and because it affects the well-being of ordinary citizens. 
Central banks have responsibilities both in macroeconomic management 
and financial sector regulation. It is natural that their responsibility should 
embrace the latter, for as we have seen, a major source of economic instability 
is the financial sector. 
The issues of inequality are intertwined with all the other issues that the 
Fed has to deal with. I have highlighted how this is true for the standard pol-
icies of macroeconomic management, as the Fed faces the difficult trade-offs 
that it regularly confronts. But it is especially true in the arena of regulation. 
For instance, if more had been done to prevent predatory lending, perhaps the 
economic shock would have been less; certainly, the adverse effect of the crisis 
on inequality would have been diminished. 
It is not an accident that the innovations of the financial sector in the years 
before the crisis did not lead to stronger economic performance, though they 
led to higher instability and greater inequality. Much of the financial sector 
innovation that was not directed at regulatory arbitrage and circumvention 
was centered on creating better ways of exploiting poor and financially unso-
phisticated individuals. Such exploitation may succeed in moving money from 
the bottom of the pyramid to the top, but such innovation does not provide 
the basis of stronger, sustainable growth. More effective regulations preventing 
these activities would have led to more stable growth, and more equality. 
But we need to move away from just focusing on how we can prevent the 
financial sector from doing harm, and to a more positive agenda. How can 
we create a financial sector that actually enhances opportunity? It would be a 
different financial sector from the one we have today, but I believe it is achiev-
able, and I believe the Fed has an important role in attaining this goal. 
The Roosevelt Institute, where I serve as chief economist, has been actively 
engaged in two research programs, one focusing on how to make our finan-
cial markets function better, the other on how to create more shared pros-
perity—how to reduce the country’s high level of inequality and promote 
equality of opportunity. The two strands of our research programs are, in fact, 
closely related, because our flawed financial system is part of the reason for the 
growth in inequality. The Fed is at the center of our financial system, which is 
why what the Fed does is so important for what happens to inequality. 
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We need to realize that what has happened in the last third of a century is 
fundamentally different from what was occurring in the previous third of a 
century. Then we were in the process of creating a middle-class society based 
on opportunity for all. Since 1980, we have been creating a society where all 
the benefits of growth go to a very few at the top. Median income, adjusted 
for inflation, is lower than it was a quarter century ago. We have moved into a 
negative-sum world, where the gains at the top have not led to gains for all, but 
to slower overall growth and stagnation for the majority. 
The problems we have created are not amenable to small tweaks or minimalist 
solutions. They are simply too large. There is a need for a fundamental rethinking 
of the structure of our economic and legal framework and the policies by which 
we manage our economy. A re-examination of our macroeconomic and financial 
policies will be an important part of this rethinking. The Fed can and should play 
an important role in this process. Our recent book Rewriting the Rules (Stiglitz et 
al. 2015), provides a framework for these reforms. 
In short, we can have a better-performing economy, with higher growth and 
more equality, if monetary policy and financial regulation is conducted with 
an eye to the impact of policies on distribution. Rethinking monetary policy 
through this lens will not be easy. Reforming monetary policy will be even more 
difficult, for those who have done well under the current system have both the 
incentives and resources to use their influence to oppose these changes. 
But it is the only way forward: The only way that we can achieve sustained 
prosperity is to have shared prosperity, and the only way that we can achieve 
that is through a monetary policy and a financial system that is not based on 
trickle-down economics but rather directed at increasing the well-being of all 
Americans.  
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